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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UT^H 
DOWNEY STATE BANK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MAJOR-BLAKENEY CORPORATION, 
et al., 
Defendants, 
JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS & CO. , 
and RICHARD W. RINGWOOD, 
Interveners. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT! 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Joseph L. Krofcheck, appeals from an 
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Suittmit County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. presiding, 
entered March 17, 1976 amending the Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure of March 4, 1974 and awarding to the Respondent, 
from surplus funds on deposit with the Coi^ rt, additional 
Case No. 14546 
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attorneys1 fees incurred in resisting proceedings initiated by 
the Appellant (including an unsuccessful appeal) in an attempt 
to vacate the said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully submits to this Court that the 
Order of the Third Judicial District Court amending the Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure of March 4, 1974 should be sustained, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October, 1973, Downey State Bank of Downey, Idaho 
commenced this action to foreclose two mortgages on five unre-
leased parcels of land in Summit County near the ill-fated Park 
City West ski resort for the purpose of recovering the principal 
($26,800*00) and interest ($5,097*09) owing on two mortgages 
given by Major-Blakeney Corporation which had fallen into de-
fault in May of 1971, Downey State Bank soon discovered that 
Major-Blakeney Corporation had ceased doing business in Utah in 
1969 and that its interest in the five parcels, had in the 
interim, been transferred to William S, Richards and had ulti-
mately come to rest in "Joseph L. Krofcheck, trustee" as an 
apparent nonassuming grantee (a California psychiatrist, the 
nature of whose trusteeship and the identities of whose benefi-
ciaries are as yet unknown to Respondent)• 
A Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was entered on 
March 4, 1974. On April 9, 1974, Deputy Sheriff Leon Wilde 
conducted a sale of the five parcels of land, four of which 
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were sold to the Intervenor, Franklin Dt Richarda & Co,, and 
one of which was sold to the Intervenor Richard Ringwood. 
After satisfaction of the costs of sale and the judgment of 
the Respondent, the sum of $9,655,58 was deposited with the 
court and notice of the deposit was sent by Downey to all of 
the named defendants. 
On October 2, 1974, the Appellant/ Joseph L. Krofcheck, 
by his attorney, in an ex p<vt£z proceeding/ moved to vacate the 
decree of foreclosure, to stay the proceedings, and to extend 
the redemption period for an additional six months. [R. 69]. 
(The motion was dated September 11, 1974, but was not filed 
until seven days prior to the expiration of the first redemp-
tion period.) On October 2, 1974, Judge Bullock extended the 
redemption period as prayed by the Appellant Krofcheck. There-
after, the purchasers at the foreclosure sale, Franklin D. 
Richards & Co. and Richard Ringwood, filed motions for leave 
to intervene and there followed a series of motions initiated 
by the Intervenors and by the Respondent, Downey State Bank, 
and opposed by the Appellant, Krofcheck, ^s both sides wrestled 
over the merit (or lack thereof), of the extended redemption 
period and the Krofcheck motion to vacate the Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure. This struggle in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court eventually drew the attention of Judge Allen B. 
Sorensen and of Judge George E. Ballif as well as of Judge 
J. Robert Bullock and hearings were had in both Coalville and 
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in Provo, generating a flurry of memoranda of "points and 
authorities" from all sides* 
Finally, on February 26, 1975, Judge Allen B. Sorensen 
denied the Krofcheck motion to vacate the decree of foreclosure, 
and on March 7, 1975, Judge J. Robert Bullock vacated his pre-
vious order extending the redemption period* From Judge 
Sorensenfs ruling, Krofcheck appealed, which appeal involved 
yet another round of preliminary motions surrounding Krofcheck's 
attempt to supplement the record on appeal with two affidavits 
not presented to the court below. Upon this Court's denial of 
the Krofcheck motion to supplement the record on appeal, briefs 
were filed and oral argument was heard, culminating in the 
unanimous decision of this Court affirming the rulings and 
orders of Judges Sorensen and Bullock in Voumzy Statz Bank v. 
Majoi-Blakznzif Coip., zt aJL., 545 P.2d 507 filed January 26, 
1976* The case was remitted to the Third Judicial District 
Court on February 26, 1976 whence ensued the proceedings from 
which Krofcheck now appeals.!./ (See "Disposition in the Lower 
Court." 
1/A1SO in April of 1976, after the Respondent Downey 
refused to restore Krofcheck to his former rights, Krofcheck 
filed yet another lawsuit against the Sheriff of Summit County, 
Downey State Bank, and Downey's counsel alleging fraud on this 
Court and seeking to vacate the Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure of March 4, 1974 and other relief. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After the entry of this Court's decision in the 
Appellant's first Appeal, Vownztf Statu B«infc v. Majoi-BlakzyiZLf 
Co*p., tt al.p 545 P.2d 507 (1976) [See Appendix "A"], wherein 
this Court unanimously upheld the refusal of the Fourth Judi-
cial District Court to vacate the Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure entered March 4, 1974, this case was remitted 
February 26, 19 76 to the Court of the Third Judicial District 
of Summit County, Downey State Bank thei| moved the lower 
court to amend the original Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
to award unto Downey the sum of the attorneys1 fees incurred 
and paid by Downey in resisting the Appellant's attempts to 
vacate the original judgment, including the Krofcheck appeal. 
Notice of the hearing on the Downey motion was given both by 
Downey and by the Clerk of the Court to all of the named 
defendants in the proceeding. At the hearing held on March 15, 
1976 only counsel for Downey appeared although counsel for the 
Appellant sent a memorandum in opposition to Downey's motion 
to the court (a copy of which was furnished to counsel for 
Downey by the court at the hearing). Upon consideration of 
argument advanced by counsel for Downey and upon receipt of 
testimony concerning the hours spent, the documents prepared, 
the appearances made, and the value of suph legal services 
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rendered on behalf of Downey and paid by Downey since March 4, 
1974, the court granted the Downey motion. The order now 
appealed from by Krofcheck was entered on March 17, 1976 
[Appendix "B"], with the result that Downey was paid the sum 
of these additional attorneys! fees from the surplus funds 
on deposit with the Court. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. 
DOWNEY STATE BANK WAS ENTITLED TO BE REIMBURSED 
FOR THE ATTORNEYS1 FEES IT INCURRED AS THE RE-
SULT OF KROFCHECK'S UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO 
SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND HIS 
SUBSEQUENT APPEAL. 
The two real estate mortgages which were foreclosed by 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in previous proceedings in 
this case each provided as follows: 
If because of default this mortgage and note for 
which the same is given as security is given to an 
attorney for collection, Mortgagor [Major-Blakeney 
Corp., the grantor of Krofcheck's grantor] agrees 
to pay a reasonable attorney's fee together with 
all costs incurred. 
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Each of the Promissory Notes which were secured by the said 
mortgages which provided as follows: 
If action be instituted herein for collection, the 
undersigned [Major-Blakeney Corp.] promises to pay 
such sum as the court may fix as reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure entered by the 
Fourth Judicial District Court on March 4, 1974 gave judgment 
to Downey State Bank for the "sum now due and owing to plain-
tiff fl including interest and attorneys1 fees incurred through 
that date. Neither the court nor Downey State Bank could have 
then foreseen the extensive proceedings initiated by Krofcheck 
on October 4, 1974 when he moved to vacate the decree of fore-
closure , which proceedings ultimately culminated in Krofcheckfs 
unsuccessful appeal to this Court. Vown&y State. Bank v. 
Majosi-Blakznzy CoKp., tt al., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah, 1976) 
decision by Justice Crockett [Appendix AT. 
Krofcheck now presses upon this Court the artificial 
hypothesis that because the judgment did not contain the 
magical incantation "plus any additional attorneys1 fees 
incurred on appeal," or something to that effect, that Downey 
is now barred from its contractual and statutory right to 
recover from the excess funds received at the sale of the 
property the additional damages inflicted upon Downey by the 
Krofcheck attacks. Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-9. 
Krofcheck completely overlooks Swatn v. Salt Lakz R&al 
E&tatz & lnve.Atme.nt Co., 3 Utah2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955), 
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which decision plainly repudiates the Krofcheck hypothesis. 
Although Swain did not involve a mortgage foreclosure and 
extensive (and unsuccessful) attempts by a nonassuming grantee 
to set aside the foreclosure decree, Chief Justice McDonough 
was clearly of the opinion that where a contract provides for 
an award of attorneys1 fees in the event of a lawsuit, and 
where the party claiming such fees prevails on appeal, this 
Court may award additional attorneys' fees incurred on 
appeal. 
Contrary to the impression conveyed to this Court by 
the Appellantfs brief on appeal, the vast weight of authority 
is to the effect that a Respondent who successfully resists 
attacks made upon a prior judgment in the Respondent's favor, 
is also entitled (if the contract provides for the payment of 
attorneys' fees) to be reimbursed for the attorneys' fees 
incurred in its own defense, including attorneys' fees incur-
red on appeal. Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 384 F.2d 365 
(5th Cir. 1967). klzxandzK v. Glov&A, 345 F.Supp. 848 (D. Mary-
land, 1972). Alabama City, G. 6 k. Ry. Co. v. Kylz, 204 Ala. 
597, 87 So. 191 (1920). Stttlz v. Vandztellcz, 90 Ariz. 277, 
367 P.2d 636 (1961). VomqlaA v. Vancouvz/i Plywood Co., 16 Ariz. 
2/Krofcheck's reliance upon Ma&k6 v. CixlmzK, 7 Utah 163, 
25 P. 743 (1891) is misplaced. Matik* v. CmlmzK merely holds 
that absent some specific legislative authorization (such as 
Utah Code Annotated § 34-27-1 where attorneys' fees in wage 
claims may be taxed as "costs"), attorneys' fees are not taxed 
as "costs" on appeal. Downey makes no claim that it is entitled 
to such attorneys' fees as part of its "costs" on appeal. 
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App. 364, 493 P.2d 531 (1972). GuAtafaon v. State, 11 Ariz.App. 
176, 462 P.2d 869 (1969). WiJUovi v. Wilton, 54 Cal.2d 264, 352 
P.2d 725 (1960). Beckman v. Skaggb , 61 Cal. 362 (1882). Rabino-
uoitch v. Ca.LLhon.nla. Western Ga& Co., 257 Cal.App. 2d 150, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 1 (1968). Erbe Coup. v. W 6 B Realty Co., Inc./ 255 Cal. 
App.2d 773, 63 Cal.Rptr. 462 (1967). Martindell v. Bodrero, 256 
Cal.App.2d 56r 63 Cal.Rptr. 744 (1967). Lawrence Block Co., Inc.. 
\j. England, 211 Cal.App.2d 318, 27 Cal.Rptr. 362 (1963). Sckerwin 
v. Shoilak, 213 Cal.App.2d 37, 28 Cal.Rptr. 332 (1963). Breven 
Carpet* Cofip. v. Vavi*, 210 Cal.App.2d 206, 26 Cal.Rptr. 513 
(1962). Wie&e v. Steinauer, 201 Cal.App.2d 651, 20 Cal.Rptr. 295 
(1962). Anderson v. Hlatt, 181 Cal.App.2d 9, 4 Cal.Rptr. 858 
(1960). Automatic. Vending Co. v. Wisdom, 181 Cal.App.2d 354, 6 
Cal.Rptr. 31 (1960). Vankert v. Lamb Finance. Co., 146 Cal.App.2d 
499, 304 P.2d 199 (1957). Cirimele v. Skinazy, 134 Cal.App.2d 
50, 285 P.2d 311 (1955). Hahn v. Hahn, 123 Cal.App.2d 97, 
266 P.2d 519 (1954). Stockton Theatre* v. Palermo, 124 Cal. 
App.2d 353, 268 P.2d 799 (1954). Zambfi.uk v. Perlmutter 3rd 
Generation Builder*, Inc. 32 Colo.App. 276, 510 P.2d 472 
(1973). Empre** Home.*, Inc. v. Levin, 201 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 
App., 1967). Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91 Idaho 544, 428 P.2d 50 
(1967). Qati* v. Vecluze, 226 La. 751, 77 So.2d 28 (1954). 
New England Merchant* Hat. Bank ofa Bo*ton v. Ho**, 356 Mass. 
331, 249 N.E.2d 635 (1969). T. M. Stride*, v. Western Casualty 
S Surety Co., 10 So.2d 350 (Miss., 1942). Cabot v. Fir*t Hat. 
Bank oi Santa Fe, 81 N.M. 795, 474 P.2d 478 (1970). Shoup v. 
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Mayesuon, 454 P.2d 666 (Okla., 1969). Washington Tsuut Co. v. 
fatone, 106 R.I. 168, 256 A.2d 490 (1969). Corinthian Co/tp. 
v. White 6 Ballard, Inc., 74 Wash.Dec.2d 49, 442 P.2d 950 
(1968). Paget Sound Mutual Savings Bank v. Lllllons, 50 
Wash.2d 799, 314 P.2d 935 (1957). F. S. Jones Const. Co. v. 
Duncan Crane S Rigging, Inc., 2 Wash.App. 509, 468 P.2d 699 
(1970). Ranta v. German, 1 Wash.App. 104, 459 P.2d 961 (1969). 
Of the foregoing cases, Hahn v. Hahn, Vuget Sound 
Mutual Saving* Bank v. Lllllons, Steele v. Vandersllce, 
Empress Homes, Inc. v. Levin, and Beckman v« Skaggs all in-
volved mortgage foreclosures where the mortgagee-respondents 
were awarded additional attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal. 
The above-cited decisions in Alexander v. Groves, Cabot v. 
First Hatlonal Bank o£ Santa Fe, Workington Trust Co. v. 
F'atone, Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., and Clrlmele v. Sklnazy 
are substantially, if not completely devoted to the issue of 
the award of additional attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal to 
parties successful on appeal. In a footnote to Freeman v. 
Continental Gin Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals notes 
the case of Hale* v. Snowden, 40 Cal.App.2d 801, 105 P.2d 1015 
(1940), relied upon by Krofcheck^[Appellant's Brief p. 5] and 
remarks that Hale* v. Snowden is not California law, which 
2/Appellant cites 59 C.J.S. "Mortgage*" § 812 at p. 
1551, footnote number 75, which is actually a quotation from 
the headnote of Holer v. Snowden. 
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conclusion was probably based upon the wealth of California 
cases which adopt the majority rule. 384 F.2d 365, at 366. 
In Cabot v. fitut Hat. Eank oh Santa Fe, the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico repudiated the Krofcheck theory (Halt* v. 
Snowd&n) when it noted: 
As a general rule, the cause of action does merge into 
the judgment, but the incident of the debt may be 
carried forward to prevent the inequitable destruction 
of a contract right. 
474 P.2d 478 at 480. 
In Pugzt Sound Mutual Saving* Sank v. Lllllon*, the 
Supreme Court of Washington construed language providing 
for the award of attorneys1 fees in the event of a default 
which is substantially the same as that contained in the 
Major-Blakeney mortgages. The court declared: 
When a note and mortgage contain contractual 
provisions such as we are considering, we believe 
they indicate that the parties contemplated that the 
mortgagee would be entitled to the allowance of a 
reasonable attorneyfs fee for all legal services 
required to prosecute the foreclosure to its ultimate 
conclusion, should foreclosure be necessary. This 
would include the right to a fee for the defense or 
prosecution of an appeal to this court. Such a fee 
is as much a part of the obligation of the contract 
as any other part. 
314 P.2d 935 at 940. And in Hakn v. Hakn (which also in-
volved a mortgage foreclosure) , the District Court of 
Appeals of California construed language similar to that 
contained in the Major-Blakeney promissory notes, noting: 
•16-
The note provides that if action be instituted 
thereon, defendant promises to pay such sum as the 
court may fix as attorney's fees for services to the 
time it was entered. Plaintiff says he should be al-
lowed additional attorney's fees for defendant against 
the appeal. The purpose of a provision for attorney's 
fees in a promissory note is to indemnify the creditor 
against the necessity of paying attorney's fee (cita-
tion omitted) and to enable him to recover the full 
amount of his debt without deduction for legal 
expenses. [Emphasis added] 
266 P.2d 519 at 523. The justification for such a holding is 
clear: 
the purpose of a provision requiring a debtor to reim-
burse the creditor for the expense of counsel fees 
reasonably incurred in enforcing the obligation on 
default is to insure the creditor that he will not 
lose the~benefit of his bargain because of the debtor's 
default"! When the parties enter into such a contract, 
they contemplate that when the debt matures, the credi-
tor will receive what he bargained for undiminished by 
the expenses which he was forced to incur by the debtor's 
default. It is immaterial whether these expenses were 
incurred in a trial court or in appellate proceedings, 
(citation omitted) [emphasis added]. 
Washington Titat Co. v. Fatonz, 256 A.2d 490 at 494. This 
position was adopted by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Vaughn v. 
Vaughn when it characterized the rule as that of "the more 
recent and in our opinion the better reasoned cases." 42 8 
P.2d 50 at 54. 
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II. 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN 
ITS JURISDICTION IN CHARGING DOWNEY'S ADDITIONAL 
ATTORNEYS1 FEES AGAINST THE SURPLUS FUNDS FROM 
THE FORECLOSURE SALE. 
The corollary argument advanced py Krofcheck is that 
I 
on remittur, the Third Judicial District Court had no 3uns-
diction to amend the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure of 
March 4, 1974.1/ 
Krofcheckfs argument overlooks the critical fact that 
the Third Judicial District Court had jurisdiction over the 
fund on deposit with that court with a responsibility to "cause 
the same to be paid to the person entitled to it . . • ." Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-37-4. Krofcheck also ignores the fact that 
in the first appeal, that party who should have been most in-
terested in the disposition of the surplus funds received from 
the foreclosure sale (from which funds Downeyfs claim for addi-
tional attorneys1 fees had to be satisfied — since Krofcheck 
4/The Order now appealed from by Krofcheck was entered 
by Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. with retroactive effect, i.e. 
nunc ptio tunc, to avoid the claim that byt amending the decree 
of foreclosure, a new six month redemption period would begin 
to run. The Respondent's caution in attempting to avoid such 
a claim was born of its experience with the previous appeal 
and with several other appeals prosecuted by the Appellant on 
related cases involving neighboring landg* 
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is an apparent nonassuming grantee), i.e. Richards & Richards, 
was not represented before this Court. Nor did this Court have 
any evidence before it concerning the proper disposition of 
such surplus. Nor had this Court any evidence before it from 
which it could reasonably assess the sum of the attorneysf fees 
actually incurred and paid by Downey since March 4, 1974, nor 
indeed could such fees have been determined until the appeal 
itself was resolved. Under such circumstances, Downey submits 
that it was appropriate for Downey to have submitted its motion 
to amend the original judgment and decree of foreclosure to the 
trial court where, only after due notice to all of the co-
defendants including lien claimants,6/and upon the receipt by 
the trial court of the undisputed testimony of counsel for 
Downey concerning the actual attorneys1 fees incurred by Downey 
as a result of the Krofcheck motions and unsuccessful appeal, 
the order now complained of was entered. In view of this 
Court's decisions requiring that an award of attorneys1 fees 
5/The record reveals that Richards & Richards claims an 
attorneys1 lien against the property by virtue of a Notice of 
Lien dated November 14, 1972 and recorded November 15, 1972. 
So much of this lien as encumbered parcel 12 of the property 
was assigned to the Intervenor in this case, Franklin D. Rich-
ards & Co. on September 26, 1974 and according to an affidavit 
filed by the successor to Richards & Richards, dated July 5, 
1976, the lien was as yet unsatisfied. 
6/The record reveals that notice of Downey's proposed 
Motion to Amend Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was given 
not only to all of the co-defendants by Downey, but that notice 
of the hearing on the motion was given to all parties by the 
clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, at 
which hearing only counsel for Downey appeared. 
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by a lower court in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding be sup-
ported by evidence of reasonableness, including the proffer 
of testimony if necessary, it is respectfully suggested that 
the most reasonable and appropriate procedure under the cir-
cumstances was adopted by the Third Judicial District Court. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-9. C.f. F.M.A. financial Coip. 
v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965). KuJtfz v. 
Ogdtn Canyon Sanitarium Co., 37 Utah 313, 108 P. 14 (1910). 
Such a motion to amend the original Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure was in the nature of a supplemental 
petition and the jurisdiction of a trial court to entertain 
such a petition after an appeal under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure was extensively considered in Ale.xande.fi y. 
G/iov&A, 345 F.Supp. 848 (D. Maryland, 1972). In concluding 
that it was proper for a party which was successful on appeal 
to return to the trial court and there to present evidence 
concerning attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal, the AZe.xande.si 
court relies in part upon the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Washington in Pugzt Sound Mutual Saving* Bank v. Lllllon^, 
50 Wash.2d 799, 314 P#2d 935 (1957). In Vugtt Sound, after the 
defendant-appellant had perfected its appeal, the plaintiff-
respondent filed a motion in the lower court for a deter-
mination and allowance of attorneys1 fees incurred on appeal. 
The lower court denied the motion on the ground that when 
the appeal had been perfected, it had lost further jurisdiction 
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over the case — at least until the case was remitted* Upon 
the filing of a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the 
lower court to hear the plaintiff-respondent's motion for 
attorneys' fees on appeal the Washington Supreme Court determined 
that any decision on the attorneys' fees on appeal should await 
the court's consideration of the appeal on its merits. But 
after upholding the judgment of the lower court, the Pugzt 
Sound court held that the filing of the petition before the 
appeal had been heard was premature, and the court remanded 
the matter to the trial court for a determination and award of 
the attorneys' fees incurred on appeal* 314 P.2d 935 at 
940-941. 
And in F/tzzman v. Contlnzntal Gin Co., 384 F.2d 365 at 
366 (1967), the Fifth Circuit said that: 
In allowing additional fees for legal services on appeal 
in statutory actions, this Court has sometimes fixed the 
amount thereof* (Citations omitted). More recently it 
has said that this "should be determined in the first 
instance by the district court." (Citations omitted). 
whereupon the case was remanded to the lower court for a deter-
mination of the fees incurred on appeal. This procedure was 
adopted in the following cases: GuAtafaon v. Statu, 11 Ariz. 
App. 176, 462 P.2d 869 (1969). Wzitz v. SttlnamtK, 201 Cal. 
App.2d 651, 20 Cal.Rptr. 295 (1962). ClKlmzld v. Sklnazy,1/ 
Citiimzlt v. Sklnazy, the California Court of Appeals 
heard two appeals, and after remand of the first appeal and the 
trial court's failure to award unto the plaintiff its attorneys' 
fees on the first appeal, the Court of Appeals amended the judg-
ment on the second appeal and awarded attorneys' fees incurred 
on both appeals. 
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134 Cal .App.2d 50 , 285 P.2d 311 (1955) . I Zamb/iuk v. ?lAlmtUtzti 
S/id Generation Bmltdc/U, Inc., 32 Colo.A^p. 276, 510 P .2d 472 
(1973) . Mcu) England ttctickant* Hat. Bank c£ Boston v. tfc44, 
356 Mass. 3 3 1 , 249 N.E.2d 635 (1960) . F« S. Jonte Con*t. Co. 
v. Duncan Cianc & Rigging, Inc., 2 Wash.App. 509, 468 P .2d 699 
(1970) . 
I I I . 
AS MORTGAGEE, DOWNEY STATE BANK'S CLAIMS AGAINST 
THE SURPLUS FUNDS ARE SUPERIOR TQ THOSE OP 
KROFCHECK AS A "NONASSUMING GRANtEE." 
In his brief on appeal [pp. 7 and 8] Krofcheck confuses 
the issue by seeming to imply that Downey received a judgment 
of personal liability against Krofcheck, thereby claiming 
that the surplus fund on deposit with the court was indis-
putably his own, free of any claims advanced by Downey or by 
anyone else. Then in a lapse of logic, I^ rofcheck contradicts 
himself in admitting that "Respondent's claims involve fees 
and costs attributable to the Appellant Krofcheck, who cannot 
be held liable therefor . . . ." [Appellant's Brief, page 7]. 
The evidence adduced below does not demonstrate that 
Krofcheck is in fact a nonassuming grantee. But Krofcheck's 
status as a "nonassuming grantee11 is quitje beside the point. 
Such a status does not entitle him to ridhts in the xc* (or 
in the surplus fund) superior to "those of the original mortgagor, 
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Major-Blakeney Corp* Downey is not attempting to enforce a 
deficiency judgment against Krofcheck. (Downey State Bank did 
not obtain personal service of process on Mr* Krofcheck and as 
a result, Downey would be barred in any event from claiming a 
deficiency against Krofcheck.) Krofcheckfs brief on appeal 
notwithstanding, Downey has not proceeded <Ln pzsuonam to obtain 
a deficiency judgment against Krofcheck. Downey has proceeded 
in equity against the >KL& , claiming as the mortgagee that it 
was entitled to "be made whole" by deducting from the surplus 
fund the sum of its additional attorneys1 fees. It is Downey's 
contention that such funds represented a transmutation of the 
original security and that Krofcheck had no claim on such funds 
until all superior claims had been satisfied, including those 
of Downey, a/ 
A mortgage foreclosure is an equitable proceeding LYI 
/tern, at least until the property is sold and the proceeds of 
the sale have been applied and exhausted in discharge of the 
obligation to the mortgagee. JznAtn v. Lyicktzn^t^n, 45 Utah 
320, 145 P. 1036 (1915). Professor Powell notes: 
If there is a surplus, it represents the resid-
ual value of the equity of redemption and must be dis-
posed of accordingly. If there are no junior liens, 
the owner of the equity of redemption is entitled to 
is peculiar to note that although. Krofcheck claims 
that the surplus was entirely his, no claims were raised against 
the funds until Downey moved to amend the original Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure in February of 1976, nearly two years 
after the sale. 
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the fund. If there are persons holding junior claims 
against the foreclosed land who have been made parties 
defendant in the action, their liens on the land are 
cut off by the decree. These claims are thereby auto-
matically transferred to the surplus moneys, which 
must then be paid to such lienors in'the order of the 
priority of their liens, the remainder, if any, passing 
to the owner of the equity of redemption. [Emphasis 
added.] 
3 Powzll on ReaX Vtioptkty, Section 467. We would therefore 
conclude that in a foreclosure proceeding the security must 
first be subjected to the claims of the Mortgagee and then, if 
there is a surplus, that surplus will be| subjected to the 
claims of the junior lienors. In this ckse, only after 
satisfying the claims of Downey and of tjie junior lienor 
Richards & Richards would the mortgagor (Major-Blakeney) and 
its successor in interest (Krofcheck) haVe any claim to the 
surplus. 
Appellant1 s reference to authority's/to the effect 
that "the general rule is to allow attorneys1 fees against 
the principal debtor [Major-Blakeney] and against the land 
[>I<L& ) which is the subject of the litigation [in this case, 
the fund into which the land had been converted] . . ."is 
precisely in point, for this is exactly ^hat was done by Judge 
Hanson below! 
Indeed there is serious doubt th^t Krofcheck has any 
standing to make this appeal inasmuch as I the Richards & 
2/Appellantfs Brief, page 8 citing 59 C.J.S. "Moxtgagt*" 
§ 812, p. 1555. 
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Richards junior lien remains unsatisfied and even if the full 
sum of the surplus fund (undiminished by Downey's additional 
attorneys1 fees) were applied against the lien, the lien would 
remain unsatisfied. It would appear that even if Downey's 
motion to amend the original Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
had been denied, Krofcheck would not have had any interest in 
the fund since any residue would belong to Richards & Richards 
as a junior lienor, C. f* Application o£ f^Knan Lakz Village., 
80 Idaho 412, 331 P.2d 278 (1958). In >i<L Vzt>dltt IkonAixaKy Co., 
78 Utah 393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931). To use the phraseology of 
Qz&dtKit MoJituaJiy, Krof check now appeals Judge Hanson's order 
because he desires to claim the surplus funds, not because he 
has any right to such funds. 
CONCLUSION 
By the terms of the Major-Blakeney mortgages and promis-
sory notes, Downey State Bank was entitled to reasonable attor-
neys' fees incurred in the event of a default by the mortgagor. 
Downey was entitled to the benefit of its bargain with the 
mortgagor which means that Downey was entitled to Mbe made 
whole," even in the event of an appeal. The weight of authority 
permits Downey to be reimbursed (from funds received upon the 
sale of the security) for attorneys' fees incurred in resisting 
an unsuccessful attack on the foreclosure decree entered below. 
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The Third Judicial District Court acted within its 
jurisdiction and in accordance with the Requirements of fair-
ness and due process when it granted Dowhey's motion for an 
award of additional attorneys1 fees* The district court was 
the appropriate forum for the receipt of evidence concerning 
the reasonableness of the fees and for tfie resolution of con-
flicting claims against the surplus fundi on deposit. 
Whether or not Krofcheck was a "nonassuming grantee," 
his rights to the surplus fund are not superior to those of 
the mortgagor. Krofcheck has no claim tb anything more than 
the residue left after the funds from the sale of the land 
are applied first in satisfaction of the 
claims, and then in satisfaction of the claims of the junior 
lienor (Richards & Richards). Since it would appear that 
even if Judge Hanson had denied Downey's claim to deduct its 
additional attorneys1 fees from the surpjLus fund, there would 
still be no residue left for Krofcheck and he has no standing 
to make this appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 19176. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorney^ for the Respondent, 
Downey State Bank 
mortgageef s (Downey) 
and By 
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Appendix "A" 
DOWNEY STATE BANK v. MAJORS 
Cite AS 5, 
DOWNEY STATE BANK, Plaintiff 
V. 
ft*AJOR-8LAK£N€Y C0RP0RATIOM, a 
C*f*p*rafl«ft, S—ph L. Krgfctwelt, 
Dtfefttfaais sm4 Apptilattt, 
frmmkllm D. Rtefc*rtf* a»4 CMftftfty, aa4 
Richard W. RtngwoMi, ift4£rv#£#ps» 
No. I403U 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 26, IS?* 
Action was instituted to foreclose upon 
two mortgages. A decree of foreclosure 
was entered upon default of defendants, 
and after the Fourth District Court, Sum-
mit County, J. Robert Bullock, J., denied 
motion to set aside decree, defendants ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., 
held that plaintiff exercised reaspnable dil-
igence and good faith so as to meet re-
quirement of rules for publication of sum-
mons, that jurisdiction of court was not 
subject to attack on grounds that summons 
contained a number at variance with num-
ber given case by clerk in absence of evi-
dence that defendant was in any way mis-
led or adversely affected by variance in 
number, that failure to give a metes and 
bounds description lor property did not vi-
olate rule providing that publication of 
summons shall contain a description of 
subject matter or res involved in action, 
and that refusal to set aside default judg-
ment was not an abuse of discretion in 
view of defendant's failure to proffer any 
meritorious defense. 
Affirmed. 
r. J»*9fl»fit <S=M59, 162(2) 
An affidavit of jurisdictional facts in 
support of motion to set aside default 
judgment is not sufficient if it states mere 
conclusions as to diligent search and in-
quiry; it must set forth facts upon which 
court can base a judgment as to whether 
such diligence has been exercised to meet 
that requirement; when this is done, judg-
AKENEY CORPORATION Utah 507 
P.2d507 
ment thereon is entitled to same presump-
tion of verity as other judicial determina-
tions. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
4{f). 
2. M«rt9a§ft* <3=440 
Though plaintiff did not exhaust all 
possible means of finding and serving de-
fendant in mortgage foreclosure action^ 
where defendant's assignor had not only 
ceased doing business in Utah but had dis-
continued its post office box address in 
California, and plaintiff had made a bona 
fide attempt to serve defendant through 
the only address known to plaintiff or rea-
sonably obtainable, requirement of rule for 
publication of summons, i. e^ exercise of 
reasonable diligence and good faith, was 
met. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 4(f). 
3. Trial <S=*(I) 
Accuracy is always to be desired under 
rule requiring that actions be assigned con-
secutive file numbers* but there should be 
no penalty or adverse effect for mere er-
ror which causes no harm. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 4(c), 11,79(a). 
4* Mortgaf** <5=440 
Jurisdiction of court in mortgage fore-
closure action was not subject to attack on 
ground of alleged defects in summons as 
published, albeit that summons contained a 
number at variance with number given 
case by clerk, where it did not appear that 
defendant was in any way misled or ad-
versely affected by variance in number. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 4(c), 11, 
79(a). 
5. Mertgafts <3=»448 
Summons in mortgage foreclosure ac-
tion met requirements of rule that publica-
tion of summons contain a description of 
subject matter or res involved in action, 
notwithstanding that a metes and bounds 
description was not given for property 
which was subject matter of action, where 
a metes and bounds description would have 
been of no practical use in giving notice 
and, even assuming that published sum-
mons came to defendant's attention, an ac-
tion thereon as so described would have 
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given defendant just as good notice as one 
which gave a metes and bounds descrip-
tion. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 4(c), 
11,79(a). 
6. Judgment <S=>145{4> 
One who seeks to vacate a default 
judgment must proffer some defense of at 
least sufficient ostensible merit as would 
justify a trial of issue thus raised. 
7. JudgwMwt <S=M» 
- Refusing to set aside default judgment 
in mortgage foreclosure action did not con* 
stitute an abuse of discretion in view of 
defendant's failure to proffer any merito-
rious defense. 
8. Aw*»raM* <S=H9(I, 3) 
A party may make a special appear-
ance to contest a court's jurisdiction over 
him without submitting himself to it, but 
generally, if he asks the court for affirma-
tive relief, he thereby submits himself to 
that court's jurisdiction. 
Don R. Strong, Springville, for Krof-
check. 
Grant Macfarlane^ of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, for 
Richards. 
Nick J. Colessides and Carl J. Nemelka 
of Nemelka & Colessides, Salt Lake City, 
for Ringwood. 
Scott H. Clark and George D. Helling; 
Fabian & Clendeuin, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Defendant Dr. Joseph L* Krofcheck, a 
California resident, appeals attacking the 
trial court's refusal to grant his motion to 
set aside a default foreclosure on two 
mortgages covering lands in Summit Coun-
ty. He contends: (1) that the court did 
not acquire jurisdiction because (a) the 
plaintiffs affidavit was insufficient to jus-
tify an order to publish summons1; and 
(b) that no diligent search and inquiry was 
f. Rate 4(f), 
in fact made; (2) that the summons as 
published was defective, and (3) that the 
motion should have been granted on equi-
table grounds. The land in question, part 
of the Park City West ski development, 
was purchased in 1967 by Major-Blakeney 
Corporation, a California corporation. It 
executed two mortgages as security for 
payment of the purchase price. They were 
later assigned to the plaintiff, Downey 
State Bank, of Downey, Idaho. The mort-
gages were in default in May 1971 and a 
one year's forbearance was granted. The 
last payment of interest was made in Feb-
ruary 1972. Several months later, in Octo-
ber 1973, this action to foreclose was com-
menced. The bank then discovered that 
Major-Blakeney Corporation had ceased 
doing business in Utah and that its interest 
in the land had been transferred to Dr. 
Krofcheck, as trustee for undisclosed Cali-
fornia investors. 
The facts as recited herein are set forth 
in affidavits filed on behalf of the respec-
tive parties. In attempting to obtain serv-
ices, plaintiffs attorney contacted the last 
registered Utah agent of Major-Blakeney 
Corporation and obtained the most recent 
address of Dr. Krofcheck. The Los Ange-
les County deputy sheriff found that he 
had moved and that the new occupant did 
not know where to. Upon the basis of 
these and other facts alluded to below set 
forth in an affidavit, in accordance with 
Rule 4<f), UJELCP., an order was obtained 
for die publication of summons which was 
done. 
Defendants made no appearance* Upon 
default, a decree of foreclosure was en* 
tered March 4, 1974, and the land was sold 
at sheriffs sale April 9, 1974. On October 
2, 1974, a week before the six-month re-
demption period would expire, defendant 
Krofcheck made what he characterized as 
a special appearance and moved to vacate 
the decree; and also to extend the redemp-
tion period for an additional six months. 
The court granted the extension, which 
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was in effect during the time the parties 
prepared and presented their documenta-
tion and arguments concerning the mo-
tions. Five months later, on March 3,* 
1975, the court denied the motion to set 
aside the decree and four days later vacat-
ed the order extending the redemption. 
[13 Concerning the sufficiency of the 
plaintiffs affidavit of jurisdictional facts: 
We recognize that such an affidavit is not 
sufficient if it states mere conclusions as 
to diligent search and inquiry. It must set 
forth facts upon which the court can base 
a judgment as to whether such diligence 
has been exercised to meet that 
requirement* But when he has done so, 
his judgment thereon is entitled to the 
same presumptions of verity as other judi-
cial determinations.* 
[2] It is true that the plaintiff did not 
exhaust all possibilities pointed out by the 
defendant that it appears by hindsight 
might have been used as a means of find-
ing and serving him. But that is not what 
is required. The requirement is that there 
be exercised reasonable diligence in good 
faith.4 On the basis of what has been said 
above and the further facts shown to the 
trial court that Dr. Krofcheck's assignor, 
Major-Blakeney Corporation had ceased 
doing business in Utah, had discontinued 
its post office box address in California, 
and that there had been a bona fide at-
tempt to serve Dr. Krofchcck at the only 
address known to or reasonably obtainable 
by the plaintiff, the court was convinced 
that the requirement for publication of 
summons has been met. We are not per-
suaded to disagree with that ruling. Fur-
ther facts which may be regarded as giv-
ing general color to this situation are that 
nowhere in his pleadings and documents 
filed in this action was a current address 
given for Dr. Krofcheck, as required by 
2L Liebkardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 P. 
215 (1911) ; Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 68, 
246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
3. Wmrrcth e. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 
280 P.2d 741; Mapkeu> v. Standard ChUonite 
Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 PJ2d 951. 
Rule 11, U.R.C.P.; and it is shown that a 
co-defendant, Robert W. Major, had con-
cealed his whereabouts in order to avoid 
service. 
[3] Defendant also attacks the jurisdic-
tion of the court on the ground of alleged 
defects in the summons as published. Due 
to an error in the clerk's office, this case 
was originally given the number 4473. But 
it was found that this duplicated the num-
ber of a case just previously filed. To 
avoid confusion, the clerk gave this case 
number 4473A. But the summons as pub-
lished contained that number without the 
4<An. Defendant charges that this is in vi-
olation of Rule 79(a), U.R.C.P., which re-
quires that "actions shall be assigned con* 
secutive file numbers." No one will gain-
say that accuracy is always to be desired. 
But there should be no penalty or adverse 
effect for mere error which causes no 
harm. 
[4] Insofar as giving notice to the de-
fendants in concerned, the case number on 
a summons is of little value. It is true 
that the affidavit states that defendants 
attorney made one inquiry about the case 
numbered 4473, and was told that it did not 
relate to real property. But this was after 
the default judgment, during the redemp-
tion period. It does not appear that the 
defendant was in any way misled or ad-
versely affected by this variance in the 
number. 
[5] Defendant argues also that the sum-
mons did not meet the requirements of 
Rule 4(c), U.R.GP., that " . . . publica-
tion of summons . . . shall contain a 
description of the subject matter or res in-
volved in the action." The claimed insuf-
ficiency is that the summons described the 
subject matter of the action merely as per-
taining to "real property located in Summit 
4. See Parlcer v. Ross, 117 Utah 417, 217 P. 
2d 373, particularly concurring opinion by 
Justice Wolfe. 
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County, Utah,'* without a metes and bounds 
description. 
Dae to the limited knowledge that most 
people have about their real property, a 
metes and bounds description would be of 
Kttle practical use in giving notice. That 
purpose is much better served by giving 
some practical designation or description 
of the property. Dr. Krofcheck would 
know what real property he had any inter-
est in located in Summit County, Utah, and 
assuming the published summons came to 
bis attention, an action thereon as so de-
'scribed would have given him just as good 
notice as one which gave the metes and 
bounds description. 
[6,7] The other issue to be dealt with 
is defendant's contention that the court 
abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the default judgment A primary 
difficulty he confronts is that, as a general 
proposition, one who seeks to vacate a de-
fault judgment must proffer some defense 
of at least sufficient ostensible merit as 
would justify a trial of the issue thus 
raised.5 As the trial court appropriately 
remarked on this point: the defendant 
failed to proffer any meritorious defense, 
or in fact any defense at all. 
£8] In conjunction with what has been 
said herein, there is another matter lurking 
hi the background in this case which, 
though we do not regard as of controlling 
importance, tends to support our conclusion 
that .the trial court did not abuse his dis-
cretion in refusing to set aside the judg-
ment A party may make a special appear-
ance to contest a court's jurisdiction over 
him without submitting himself to i t But 
generally, if he asks the court for affirma-
tive relief, he thereby submits himself to 
that court's jurisdiction.* Here the de-
fendant not only made the attacks herein-
above discussed upon the -service of sum-
5b \T« sot state in awareness that this may not 
be- true if the attack is predicated solely oa 
the ground that the court was entirely with* 
out jurisdiction. See Atkinso* v. Atkinson^ 
43 Utah 53, 134 P. 595; Peterson v. Crosier, 
29 Utah 235, 81 P. 860; and cfc: 49 OJ.3. 
mons, but he combined this with the re-
quest to extend the redemption period, 
which was granted and was in effect for 
five months. He thus was in the anoma-
lous position of denying that the court had 
any jurisdiction to act upon his interest in 
the property, but also asking the court to 
protect that interest by extending the re-
demption period. We have not placed our 
decision herein solely upon this, latter prop* 
osition because we agree with the proce-
dure adopted by the trial court; that is, of 
staying the foreclosure from going for-
ward to avoid the possibility of allowing 
further difficulties to develop, until he de-
termined the other issues as to the court's 
jurisdiction and the soundness of the judg-
ment. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respon-
dent). 
HENRIOD, C J , and ELLETT, 
TUCKETT and MAUGHAN. TI^ concur. 
Judgments § 338; 118 A.LJL 1408; Moore's 
Federal Practice par. 55.10(1). 
fc See Rick* v. Wo4*. ** Utah 402, 93 P.2d 
479; S wet nam v. Daily, 95 Utah 74, 79 
P<2d 20; 111 AJLJt 925. 
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George D. Melling 
!l Scott H. Clark 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN _un * . i V r £ ^  <r /* 
80 0 Continental Bank Building /, ^r — ^ " ^ ^ 
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I1 Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOWNEY STATE BANK, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
I 
MAJOR-BolAKENEY CORPORATION, 
et a l . , 
Defendant, 
JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK, 
Defendant, 
and 
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS & 
COMPANY, and RICHARD W. 
RINGWOOD, 
Intervenors. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 4473-A 
This matter came before this Court upon the Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Nunc Pro Tunc 
and upon a hearing of Plaintiff's Motion on Monday, March 15, 1976 
in the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Sr. 
Due notice of the said hearing was given to all parties 
and to their counsel of record. Scott H. Clark of Fabian & 
Clendenin, appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. No other parties 
or their counsel were present. 
This Court received and considered the "Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities" filed March 15, 1976 by Don R. Strong, 
counsel for Joseph Krofcheck, one of the defendants, wherein 
Mr. Strong declined to make an appearance before this Court at 
the said hearing. A copy of the "Memorandum of Points and 
Appendix nBw 
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Authorities" was made available to plaintiff's counsel by the 
Court, a copy not previously having been made available to 
plaintiff's counsel. 
This Court received evidende in the form of sworn 
testimony concerning the attorneys' fees and expenses incurred 
J by the plaintiff in the prosecution of the instant mortgage 
foreclosure proceeding (subsequent to the entry of the original 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure on March 4, 19 74) as a result 
of the defendant's ex parte motion to extend the statutory 
redemption period, of defendant's motion to vacate the said 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, and of defendant's unsuccess-
ful appeal of the denial of defendant's motion to vacate, which 
evidence indicated the additional expenditure by the plaintiff, 
in connection with the instant mortgage foreclosure proceeding, of 
the sum of $5,421.9 8 plus the costs and attorneys' fees incurred 
in connection with this motion of $200.00 or a total of an. 
additional $5,621.98 in attorneys' fees and expenses. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure Nunc Pro Tunc is hereby granted and it is 
HEREBY ORDERED that in the interest of justice and according to 
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure of March 4, 19 74 be and hereby is 
amended, nunc pro tunc, awarding plaintiff the additional sum of 
$5,621.98 as attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in connection 
with this foreclosure proceeding. 
It is hereby further ordered that the Clerk of this 
Court disburse unto the plaintiff from among the excess funds now 
on deposit with this Court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-37-41 as a 
result of the Sheriff's Sale conducted April 9, 1974, the sum of 
$5,621.9 8 in satisfaction of plaintiff's claims for these 
additional attorneys' fees and expenses. 
DATED this / 7 3ay of March/ 1976. 
Stewart M. Hansen, Sr. 
Senior Judge 
-32-
